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MATTHEW ARNOLD had the temerity to deny, in the lecture
on Emerson which he addressed to his first audience in
Boston, that his subject deserved place among "the legitimate poets"
or the great men of letters or the philosophers. Yet in one of his
letters home he remarked that his hearers, among them JMiss Emer-
son, were satisfied that he rested the preacher's claim to the gratitude
of many generations on the simple grounds that, like Alarcus
Aurelius, Emerson was "the friend and aider of those who would
live by the spirit." Insofar as his lectures on "The \ arieties of
Religious Experience" represent him, William James merits the
same classification.
It would be uncharitable not to acknowledge his charit\' toward
"the intellectual cripples and the moral hunchbacks," as I'rofessor
Santayana has referred to James' "cases." His discourses are pre-
eminently a study in "the relativity of different t}pes of religions to
difi^erent t}"pes of need." He responded with quick s}mpathy to any
"spontaneous need of character."-—
•
Here is the real core of the religious problem : Help ! help ! No
prophet can claim to bring a final message unless he says things that
will have a sound of reality in the ears of victims such as these. But
the deliverance must come in as strong a form as the complaint, if it is
to take effect ; and that seems a reason why the coarser religions, re-
vivalistic, orgiastic, with blood and miracles and supernatural operations,
may possibly never be displaced. Some constitutions need them too
much.
James' recognition that "The gods we stand by are the gods we
need and can use;" his vigorous denial of objecti^•e truth as a criter-
ion by which the validity of religion is to be judged, and his substitu-
tion for this of religion's efficac}- in relieving, or fulfilling, "a pro-
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found interior need of many persons," led to this conclusion:
Taking creeds and faith-state together, as forming 'reHgions,' and
treating these as purely subjective phenomena, without regard to the
question of their 'truth,' we are obliged, on account of their extraordinary-
influence upon action and endurance, to class them amongst the most
important biological functions of mankind. . . . 'The truth of the
matter can be put,' says Leuba, 'in this way: God is not known, he is
not understood ; he is used—sometimes as meat-purveyor, sometimes as
moral support, sometimes as friend, sometimes as an object of love. If
he proves himself useful, the religious consciousness asks for no more
than that. Does God really exist? How does he exist? What is he?
are so many irrelevant questions. Not God, but life, more life, a larger,
richer, more satisfying life, is, in the last analysis, the end of religion.
The love of life, at any and every level of development, is the religious
impulse.'
At this purely subjective rating, therefore. Religion must be con-
sidered vindicated in a certain way from the attacks of her critics. It
would seem that she cannot be a mere anachronism and survival, but
must exert a permanent function, whether she be with or without intel-
lectual content, and whether, if she have any, it be true or false.
This is the positive outcome of James' examination of the
phenomena of religious experience. It has proved important. Fol-
lowing his recapitulation of earlier and contemporary investigations,
and his emphatic statement of his ow^n findings, later students, with
the more powerful and precise instrument provided them by a larger
body of psychological data, have defined religion as a function of
the nervous constitution whereby an individual compensates himself
for deficiencies in himself or in his relation to his environment. To
have adumbrated this conclusion justifies James in his non-
traditional method of handling the subject, even to his gullible
tenderness for the most mopsy of his specimens.
II
Plainly, a corollary of his idea of religion is that a person who
feels no deficiency in himself or his circumstances, or at least none
that he cannot rectify by the exercise of other functions, will not
need or have a religion. This proposition is scarcely less important
than the one from which it proceeds. For the only evidence of the
existence of a function is its operation. If some human beings do
not manifest the phenomena of religion, this function cannot be
regarded as a constant element in human character. In this case
one of two things is true : either experience can be lived satisfactorily
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without dependence on such a function, or the shortcomings of Ufe
can be made up to the indi\'idual who suffers them by some other
kind of activity that is Hke rehgion in some respects but }et different
in others.
This question, whether rehgion is the means of revising the
errors of circumstance, as the pathetic fallacy suggests that the^ be
regarded, or whether it is merely a possible way out of difficulties,
is of more than academic interest. Considered solel\- b\' James'
own standard, its degree of usefulness as a guide in conduct, the
answer is important. For religion needs no justification to the
person whose sole sustenance is its fruit. The one most concerned
in its establishment or disestablishment as a primary, autonomous
function is the man or woman whose every tradition exhorts to its
profession but whose intellect prompts to dismiss or ignore it. To
such the problem is real enough.—Life attracts with a multitude of
goods that may be had for the getting. I must choose the finest, the
surest of them to try for. Even after this elimination, the effort
will fill an arduous lifetime. I must strip for it—must throw oft"
every impediment. Is the faith of my mothers such a superfiuit\?
Or is the universal experience of mankind such that I had better
keep this thing—if not actively practice its use, at least retain it in
deference to a possible emergenc}-?
James offered little explicit counsel on such a dilemma. In his
first lecture on conversion he said
:
Some persons
. . . never are, and possibly never under any circum-
stances could be, converted. Religious ideas cannot become the centre of
their spiritual energy.
. . . Such inaptitude for religious faith may in
some cases be intellectual in its origin. ... In other persons the trouble
is profounder. There are men anaesthetic on the religious side, deficient
in that category of sensibility.
Is the intellect inept in religious faith deficient, or is the capacity
for faith a saving supplement to an intellect otherwise incapable of
relieving its own embarrassments ? James only answered by in-
ference. According to the empiricism that formed the platform
upon which his whole discussion was conducted, insusceptibilitv to
faith would be a defect in a character that radically needed saving
and could be saved by nothing but faith. Granted. But two ques-
tions remain unsettled : Will anything but faith save such a char-
acter? and, are all characters such as need saving or, eventually,
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will stand in that condition? It will be apparent presently that
James did not beg these questions ; for a reason, he neglected them.
It has remained for later pragmatists to discover that art, which he
treated only by a reference to its service as ritual ornament to re-
ligion, and the philosophies that desiderate unity, spirituality,
eternity, immortalit}' of the soul and freedom of will, are functions
that may perform the same office ascribed to religion. These think-
ers also have been brilliantly clear in the contention that defects of
experience arising from an interior confusion of the personality
may be overcome bv the cultivation of the function of intelligence,
and that maladjustments of individuals to their environments ma}' be
removed by concerted social action. In this is a positive answer to
the corollary James ignored.
Ill
But why did he ignore it ? The fact is that James did not con-
sider the case of the man who does not need religion because he did
not believe that such a one existed. In the quarter-century since
these lectures were delivered and published, James has got a great
reputation for what he called "healthy-mindedness," for a specially
balanced and unobjectionable optimism—for what more simple opti-
mists vaguely denote as "wholesomeness." The virtue has been
imputed to him because of his charity and because his private belief
coincided to a remarkable degree with the common faith that pre-
dominated in his time. "He seems to have felt sure," Santayana
observes, "that certain thoughts and hopes—those familiar to a
liberal Protestantism—were every man's true friends in life." This
is true: in view of the universal propensity to regard agreement
with one's self or one's sect as righteous and genial, it is clear why
James was accepted as "wholesome" and optimistic. liut the truth
is that he was profoundly pessimistic. There are marks of this fact
throughout the book ; this extract is representative
:
To suggest personal will and effort to one all sicklied o'er with the
sense of irremediable impotence is to suggest the most impossible of
things. What he craves is to be consoled in his very powerlessness, to
feel that the spirit of the universe recognizes and secures him, all decay-
ing and failing as he is. Well, we are all such helpless failures in the
last resort. The sanest and best of us are of one clay with lunatics and
prison inmates, and death finally runs the robustest of us down. And
whenever we feel this, such a sense of the vanity and provisionality of
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our voluntary career comes over us that all our morality appears but as
a plaster hiding a sore it can never cure, and all our well-doing as the
hollowest substitute for that well-being that our lives ought to be
grounded in, but, alas ! are not.
If this credo is insufficient to categorize its author among his
"sick souls," there is plent}- of additional evidence that he belongs
among them. Optimism has undashed confidence in the individual's
abilitv to correct discrepancies between wish and natural circum-
stance. This mood was ahen to James at bottom.
—
If one has ever taken the fact of the prevalence of tragic death in
this world's history fairly into his mind,—freezing, drow'ning, entomb-
ment alive, wild beasts, worse men, and hideous diseases,—he can with
difficulty, it seems to me, continue his own career of worldly prosperity
without suspecting that he may all the while not be really inside the game,
that he may lack the great initiation.
This being liis view, James could hardly be counted on, were he
living now. to support the program Professor Dewe}' proposed in
Reconstruction in Philosophy. A man who must confess this as
his final conviction is likely to overlook the possibility of the ex-
istence of others, no less averse than himself to articles of "healthy-
minded" faith that are callow though merchantable, who are con-
scious of no need for compensatory religion. And, by his rule that
"the deliverance must come in as strong a form as the complaint, if
it is to take efifect," one must look for a profound manifestation of
religious feeling in one who could say, "Our civilization is founded
on the shambles, and every individual existence goes out in a lonely
spasm of helpless agony."
IV
Xot in any marked idiosyncrasy of James' personal "over-belief"
—for, as Santayana has recognized, it was far from unique—but in
the extraordinary lengths he went to, to firm-found and fortify it,
is to be found evidence of this profundity. His need of a faith
impelled him to a final absolute that is a little shocking in contrast
with the sustained empiricism of his previous discourse.
"Disregarding the over-beliefs, and confining ourself to what is
common and generic," he said, in recapitulation of his conclusions,
"we have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous zvith a
under self through which saving experiences come, a positive con-
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tent of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and
objectively true as far as it goes."
This reassurance must have been consoling to those who had
been warned in the preceding lecture that "we . . . must bid a
definite goodby to dogmatic theology" and that "In all sincerity our
faith must do without that warrant." The consolation cost its
minister a dialectical and a psychological error.
".
. .
is there." he asked, "under all the discrepancies of the
creeds, a common nucleus to which they bear their testimony un-
animously ?"
This he answered affirmatively.
—
. . . there is a certain uniform deliverance in which religions all
appear to meet. It consists of . . . (1) a sense that there is some-
thing zvrong about us as we naturally stand. . . . (2) a sense that
zvc are saved frovi tlie ziroiigiicss by making proper connection with the
higher powers.
Then he amplified.
The individual, so far as he suffers from his wrongness, ... is
to that extent consciously beyond it, and in at least possible touch with
something higher, if anything higher exist. Along with the wrong part
there is thus a better part of him, even though it may be but a most
helpless germ. . . . when . . . the stage of solution or salvation arrives,
the man identifies his real being with the germinal higher part of him-
self. . . . He beeo)nes conseious tliaf tin's Iiiglier part is conterminous
and coutiiiiious zcifli a MORE of flic same quality, zvliieli is opera fiz'e in
tlie uniz'erse outside of turn, and zvliicli lie ean Jicep i}i zvortaing toiicli
zi'itli, and in. a fasliion get on hoard of and saz'e liimself zvlien all Iiis
lozver l>eing lias gone to pieces in the zcreck.
Then presently he inquired
:
Is such a 'more' merely our own notion, or does it really exist? If
so, in what shape does it exist ? Does it act, as well as exist ? And in
what form should we conceive of that 'union' with it of which religious
geniuses are so convinced ?
To be acceptable so fully as to form a center for all an indi-
vidual's psychic energies, a religious belief must be so formulated as
to avoid conflict with any active current of that force. So it is
natural that James found a way to make his answer accord with
the technology that was his habitual instrument of operation : "we
shall do well," he said, "to seek first of all a way of describing the
'more,' which psychologists may also recognize as real. The sub-
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conscious self is nowadays a well-accredited i)sycholog-ical entity ;
and I believe that in it we have exactly the mediating term required."
James was no man to shirk the dut\- of illustrating how his term
would apply. He continued :
Let me then propose, as an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on
its farther side, the 'more' with which in religious experience we feel our-
selves connected is on its hither side the subconscious continuation of our
conscious life. Starting thus with a recognized psychological fact as our
basis, we seem to preserve a contact with 'science' which the ordinary
theologian lacks. At the same time the theologian's contention that the
religious man is moved by an external power is vindicated, for it is one
of the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious region to take
on objective appearances, and to suggest to the Subject an external
control. In the religious life the control is felt as 'higher'; but since on
our hypothesis it is primarily the higher faculties of our own hidden mind
which are controlling, the sense of union with the power beyond us is
a sense of something, not merely apparently, but literally, true.
It is to be noticed that here the existence of a higher-than-the-
individual power and the mutual relation of it and the individual are
candid postulates, while in the concluding statement that was quoted
previouslv they are hypostatized as "literall\- and objectively true."
]\Ioreover, the ordinar\' theologian does not contend that an external
power is "suggested" to men nor that union with it is "sensed"; he
holds that such a power is and that its manifestations are of its
essence and so independent of human sense. But the most important
thing to be remarked is that James' hypothesis is tautological. For
the "subconscious self," whether or not it be "higher" than the con-
scious, ordinary self, is, still, self. It might appear that James was
attempting to distinguish between the two selves by asserting that
the "subconscious," or "higher," is, unlike the other, in immediate
working relation with a more ditTuse and more powerful extension
of itself. But the existence of this cosmic extension of powers
superior to those of ordinar\- humanity is just what wants proving.
It is not proved by the hypothecation of an agenc}' between it and
the individual through which the two appear to communicate.
This difficult}' is more than logical. The supposed entity is
eliminated by a plain re-statement of the psychological impasse
which James believed himself to have resolved.—One is in difficulty,
and cannot escape from its consequences by one's own powers ; so
one invokes an external helper:—the call is responded to, not by
anything actually external, but by another part, a usually (ap-
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parentl}) inoperative part, of one's self. This may or it may not
meet one's need ; those in whom it is hkely to do so are, as James
himself demonstrated, persons in whom the intellectual function is
less developed than are the emotional and imaginative propensities.
To the intellectual temperament, mere multiplication of metaphysical
terms is a singularly repugnant kind of hoodwinking. Whether or
not the process proves efficacious in the cases of various persons, it
certainly does not establish as fact "that the conscious person is
continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences
come."
V
Especially, when the glibly accredited but here insufficiently de-
scribed entity is examined. What did James mean by "the sub-
conscious self"? There can be no doubt that he was talking about
what his successors in psychology know as "the imconscious." In
his first lecture on conversion, while discussing sudden irruptive
manifestations of the phenomenon, he explained his preference for
the term since then discarded.
—
We shall erelong hear still more remarkable illustrations of sub-
consciously maturing processes eventuating in results of which we sud-
denly grow conscious. Sir William Hamilton and Professor Laycock of
Edinburgh were among the first to call attention to this class of effects
;
but Dr. Carpenter first, unless I am mistaken, introduced the term
'unconscious cerebration,' which has since then been a popular phrase of
explanation. The facts are now known to us far more extensively than
he could know them, and the adjective 'unconscious,' being for many oi
them almost certainly a misnomer, is better replaced by the vaguer term
'subconscious' or 'subliminal.'
Concluding his treatment of conversion, he identified his con-
ception explicitly.
—
The ordinary psychology, admitting fully the difficulty of tracing the
marginal outline (of consciousness), has nevertheless taken for granted,
first, that all the consciousness the person now has, be the same focal or
marginal, inattentive or attentive, is there in the 'field' of the moment,
all dim and impossible to assign as the latter's outline may be ; and,
second, that what is absolutely extra-marginal is absolutely non-existent,
and cannot be a fact of consciousness at all. . . .
I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has
occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science is the
discovery, first made in 1886, that, in certain subjects at least, there is
not only the consciousness of the ordinary field, with its usual centre
and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories.
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thoughts, and feelings which arc extra-marginal and outside of the
primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious
facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. . .
In the wonderful explorations by Binet, Janet, Breuer. Freud, Mason,
Prince and others, of the subliminal consciousness of patients with
hysteria, we have revealed to us whole systems of underground life, in
the shape of memories of a painful sort which lead a parasitic existence,
buried outside of the primary fields of consciousness, and making irrup-
tions thereinto with hallucinations, pains, convulsions, paralyses of feeling
and of motion, and the whole procession of symptoms of hysteric disease
of body and of mind. Alter or abolish by suggestion these subconscious
memories, and the patient immediately gets well. . . . They throw, as I
said, a wholly new light upon our natural constitution.
And it seems to me that they make a farther step inevitable. In-
terpreting the unknown after the analogy of the known, it seems to me
that hereafter, wherever we meet with a phenomenon of automatism,
be it motor impulses, or obsessive idea, or unaccountable caprice, or
delusion, or hallucination, we are bound first of all to make search
whether it be not an explosion, into the fields of ordinary consciousness,
of ideas elaborated outside of those fields in subliminal regions of the
mind. . . .
\Miat does the substitution of the proper term, the unconscious,
with the fairly ascertained quantum of facts it defines, do to the
proposition that "the fact that the conscious person is continuous
with a wider self through which saving experiences come ... is
hterally and objectively true?" It clarifies beyond any possible con-
fusion the relationship between the ordinary self and the "higher"
or "wider" or somehow "better" self. It deodorizes James' still
vaguer synon}-m for these latter terms—"higher powers"—of the
cosmic and extra-human aroma which was faintly present in it, even
as he used it. And it reduces the "higher" or "better" self to the
status which he determined in his first lecture.
—
When we think certain states of mind superior to others, is it ever
because of what we know concerning their organic antecedents ? No
!
it is always . . . either because we take an immediate delight in them ;
or else it is because we believe them to bring us good consequential
fruits for life.
That James should have fallen into this confusion indicates the
intensity with which he sought to vindicate his personal faith, and
consequentl}' the urgency upon him of his need for its vindication.
Beyond this, it illuminates the temper of the man—charitable toward
others because of his wish for charity toward himself, impatient of
dialectic because, as others have pointed out, he was unskilled in its
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use. Also, despite the great heap of data that forms the bulk of
these half-a-thousand pages, one is disappointed with his handling of
them. He used cases like a lawyer, to prove his points ; not as one
expects a scientist to do, setting out the facts, allocating them in
their general classifications and then analyzing them to their
minutiae to discover their significance. Referring to the sense of
the reality of the unseen, he says, "for the psychologists the tracing
of the organic seat of such a feeling would form a pretty problem."
Well, he was a ps}chologist : why did he not attempt, at least, to
solve it? He quotes pages of Tolstoy's record of his perplexities,
with the banal conclusion that the subject suffered from a melan-
cholv induced b\' general and objective circumstances: one reflects
upon the finesse with which Dr. Freud would have analyzed the
delicacies of cause and efifect involved in the case. In more than
a few instances James seems to neglect the plain duty of the psy-
chologist for the more attractive and sympathetic ofiice of befriend-
ing "those who would live b}' the spirit." So in the particular part
of his thesis under discussion: "If the grace of God miraculously
operates," he said, "it probably operates through the subliminal
door, then. But just Iww anything operates in this region is still
unexplained. . . ." \\'hy did he not explain it, rather than step
outside his special field to mediate between dogmatic metaphysics
and distressed humanity? The answer is implicit in his character;
it does not absolve him of the error of hasty generalization.
However, his concluding absolute does not invalidate his whole
conception of religion; its discovery only restores the subject to the
empiricism in which it was conceived originally. In many persons,
a sense of salvaton from inward wrong is produced by the mechan-
ism of the unconscious, and the same agency does "suggest to the
Subject an external control." In such persons one part of the self
—
if the operation must be conceived this way—does assist another
evidently inefficacious part of the self, and therefore seems to be an
agenc}' outside of and inefifably superior to the self as ordinarily
known. Psychoanalysis, in short, does not abolish religion as a
beneficent, and a direly needed, experience in many lives—those,
say, of "the intellectual cripples and the moral hunchbacks." But
for others there is nothing in the empiricism of \\'illiam James that
makes the cultivation of any of the varieties of religious experience
either desirable or inevitable.
